Commander? 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is politically committed to pursuing an enlargement process that presents n only strategic-political challenges for the current members of the Alliance but also operational challenges for the U.S. Combata Commander. While most of the strategic-political considerations are raised as part of NATO's programs for aspirant selection f membership, operational-military considerations are not fully assessed until after the membership decision is made.
The foundation of the NATO Alliance is its military strength. That military strength must remain untarnished an continue to serve as a deterrent to threats that may arise, thus ensuring the future existence of NATO. Enlargement must n weaken that deterrent, and thus threaten the existence of the Alliance.
In order to best prepare for new NATO members and maintain the military strength of NATO, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) should adopt an approach to enlargement using existing processes to preclude added resource requirements and duplication of effort. NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) program should be used as the first step in the process to identify aspirants and provide an initial assessment. Operational art considerations should then be used to further assess present capabilities within the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) process for the aspirants. This approach provides CINC USEUCOM with a current assessment of the military impact of new members entering NATO during the current round and also future rounds of NATO enlargement. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is politically committed to pursuing an enlargement process that presents not only strategic-political challenges for the current members of the Alliance but also operational challenges for the U.S.
Combatant Commander. While most of the strategic-political considerations are raised as part of NATO's programs for aspirant selection for membership, operational-military considerations are not fully assessed until after the membership decision is made.
The foundation of the NATO Alliance is its military strength. That military strength must remain untarnished and continue to serve as a deterrent to threats that may arise, thus ensuring the future existence of NATO. Enlargement must not weaken that deterrent, and thus threaten the existence of the Alliance.
In order to best prepare for new NATO members and maintain the military strength of NATO, the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) should adopt an approach to enlargement using existing processes to preclude added resource requirements and duplication of effort. NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) program should be used as the first step in the process to identify aspirants and provide an initial assessment. Operational art considerations should then be used to further assess present capabilities within the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) process for the aspirants. This approach provides CINC USEUCOM with a current assessment of the military impact of new members entering NATO during the current round and also future rounds of NATO enlargement.
PREFACE
I was assigned as a strategic planner in the Plans and Policy Division of the and duration. 12 The relative scale of operations has gone from large to generally small operations. During the cold war, NATO expected to be confronted with a requirement for extremely large (multiple Army) operations, whereas today, the scale ranges from small (battalion) to moderate (multi-corps level). The cost tolerance during the cold war in terms of both monetary and human costs was relatively high. Today, cost tolerance is very low from a financial perspective when looking at the percentage of defense spending against total national budgets. From the human cost tolerance standpoint, the zero tolerance used during the Kosovo conflict is becoming an emerging trend. Finally, these post cold war crises are viewed with increasing frequency and longer duration than previously anticipated. These trends in military operations make the challenge of assessing potential future Alliance members more difficult.
Membership Action Plan
NATO provides aspirant nations with a process to develop their own capabilities as a step toward membership into the Alliance. That process is the Membership Action Plan (MAP). MAP was unveiled during the NATO's 1999 Washington Summit and gives credibility to NATO's enlargement process. 13 To participate in this process, an aspirant nation must be a member of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and actively engaged in the PfP
Planning and Review Process (PARP). These programs are critical to the MAP as they aid aspirant nations in developing interoperability with NATO forces. The current MAP program participants include: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 14 NATO uses the MAP process to provide aspirants advice and feedback on their preparations for entry into the Alliance. However, participation in NATO's MAP process is not a guarantee for future membership for the nine PfP members currently participating in the program. 15 The MAP process covers the development and future aspirant work on political and economic, defense/military, resource, security and legal issues. 16 In sum, the MAP process prepares aspirants to attain strategic and political continuity with NATO, and provides USEUCOM with a method of identifying the aspirants and their military capabilities for assessment prior to their integration into the Alliance.
Engagement
The 2000 U.S. National Security Strategy summarizes the U.S. strategy of engagement as reaping, "significant benefits for our Nation -benefits that actively support our goals of security, prosperity, and democracy, yet always remain in consonance with our principles of protecting our national interests and advancing our values." 17 USEUCOM has begun to meet this challenge by developing PMI activities to aid in preparing for NATO enlargement.
The focus of USEUCOM's theater engagement planning process is to integrate all peacetime activity in its AOR to achieve national and theater level objectives. These theater engagement objectives include the promotion of peace and stability, and the defeat of adversaries. As part of the TEP process USEUCOM has developed methods for capabilities assessment and analysis, and resource apportionment. This data is captured within USEUCOM's Country Strategic Factors Analysis (CSFA) and Theater
Resource Apportionment Matrix (TRAM). However, these tools do not distinguish between nations in general and the aspirant nations in their assessments or analyses.
Some nations within the USEUCOM AOR have nation specific engagement plans that are focused toward U.S. theater engagement to that particular nation. Such plans for each aspirant would provide CINC USEUCOM with an initial step toward a more active approach to enlargement.
Enlargement Guidelines
The decision on which aspirant(s) will be selected for NATO membership is not yet determined, but it will be an issue for discussion during the next NATO summit in Prague 
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although NATO has a MAP program to prepare aspirant nations for possible membership and the Alliance has demonstrated its commitment for continued enlargement, NATO's ultimate aim for that enlargement is not yet determined. In fact, NATO seems to be following the direction of Napoleon when he stated, "on s'engage et puis on voit," (One commits himself then sees where he is.) 24 Given this rather fuzzy end state for enlargement, but accepting the fact that enlargement will continue to occur within the Alliance, CINC USEUCOM must best prepare his command for that eventuality. Any possible USEUCOM approach to the issue of enlargement would probably require little or no duplication of effort and be conducted by the current staff resources available to the command. One such approach would be to group (categorize) existing USEUCOM TEP programs by aspirant nation and assess the aspirants within those TEP programs using the tools of operational art.
Joint Publication 3-0 characterizes operational art through fourteen fundamental elements ranging from synergy through termination. 25 USEUCOM's planning staff should consider these facets of operational art in the formulation of an approach to enlargement.
This key consideration must not be lost. However, for the purpose of the analysis in this short essay, a simpler method will serve as our basis for analysis -the operational factors of space, time and force. Use of these basic factors will provide USEUCOM with a generic example to consider in their analyses and assessments of aspirant nations.
While the two general missions of the Alliance may be affected differently by operational factors, the application of the factors will be the same. 
Space
The operational factor of space is generally viewed as a physical dimension that encompasses land, sea, and airspace including outer space. 26 Space is an important operational factor to consider yet its overall effect depends on the factors of forces and time. 27 Two of five fundamental factors that Sun Tzu used to appraise warfare include weather and terrain. 28 These elements can roughly be interpreted as the operational factor space. Although numerous aspects of the operational art factor of space could be addressed in this analysis, I will only review the possible affects of bordering nations and sea access to illustrate how such a consideration could be applied to aspirant nations. 
Time
A factor most closely related to space is the operational factor of time. Time is the most precious factor that a commander has at his disposal, for once time is lost, it can never be recaptured. 30 As the modern technological advances have significantly increased the pace of conflict, it has shortened the time for conflict management and planning for conflict resolution. Prudent military analysis and assessment of aspirants' capabilities will save this most critical commodity. Thus, time is the primary consideration that should persuade our theater commander to adopt the thesis of this paper. If the USEUCOM commander and his staff take an adaptive approach to the NATO enlargement issue through the grouping of their TEP and by applying basic operational art fundamentals to those TEPs, they will save valuable analysis and assessment time when the political decision on the next NATO members occurs. By categorization of TEP, I am referring to putting the USEUCOM's TEP for specific nations into a special category that would include the USEUCOM's national TEP for all NATO aspirant nations.
Thoughtful analysis and planning in preparation for the arrival of potential new NATO members will aid CINC USEUCOM in integrating those aspirant nations into his theater plans once the membership decision is made.
The timing of the acceptance of new members into the Alliance demonstrates that there is a basic art of regulating the occurrence of an event to achieve the most desirable results of that event. The current interrelationship between aspirant nations and nations who either border them or have shared a long history with them could impact on the timing of their selection. Although NATO has stated that these relations will not have an impact on timing of their selection process, in reality such issues cannot be ignored and should be openly debated. For example, Russians of all political backgrounds are inexorably opposed to NATO membership for the Baltic Republics. 
Force
The operational factor of force comprises a number of ingredients that "are physical in character, such as the number of personnel, weapons and equipment, physical mobility, firepower, command organization, logistics, and quality of weapons and equipment." 33 The force of an aspirant nation can readily be viewed through the sheer physical number of forces available. However, basic numbers do not provide us with a full understanding of the true capability of that force. For example, an aspirant may have an extremely large force numerically, but if that force is inadequately trained, poorly led and improperly equipped, it may be more of a detriment than an asset to the overall military might of that nation. Conversely, a force properly trained, led and equipped would be an asset to the Alliance and a force multiplier that is better prepared to support the Through the application of these engagement plans, USEUCOM will have a complete military assessment of aspirants' capabilities well before the political decision on membership is made. Although the NATO membership decision is almost solely based on political considerations and the military has no veto authority, it can only be better prepared to deal with a fait accompli. Therefore this recommendation provides USEUCOM with an adaptive approach toward the next round of NATO enlargement within the constructs of existing programs and it can readily be updated and applied to future rounds of NATO enlargement.
